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Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.: Federal Preemption
Provision Clips States' Wings on Regulation
of Air Fare Advertising
Surrounded by congressional leaders and members of his adminis-
tration, President Jimmy Carter on October 24, 1978, signed into law the
Airline Deregulation Act (ADA or Act)' and predicted that the measure
would help "lift the heavy hand of Government regulation" from the
back of the airline industry.2 This historic White House signing marked
the first time in decades that a major industry in the United States had
been deregulated.3 It was also illustrative of a sweeping philosophical
change in this country concerning the role of the federal government in
oversight of business.4 Proponents of deregulation were not able to pre-
dict, however, the extent to which states would attempt to fill the gap left
by the federal government's exit from the regulatory playing field.' The
legislation that President Carter in 1978 boasted had "few enemies" 6 is
today part of a larger fundamental debate about federalism and the shar-
ing of power between the federal and state governments.
In Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' the United States Supreme
Court was called upon to referee a regulatory tug of war over the ADA.
Morales addressed whether the ADA preempts states from using their
general consumer protection statutes to regulate the content of air fare
advertising.' In concluding that the ADA prevents a state from bringing
an action against airlines for violating state deceptive advertising stan-
dards, the Court broadly interpreted a preemption clause in the federal
statute that prohibits states from enforcing laws "relating to rates, routes,
1. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1301-1557 (1988). The ADA
amended the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (FAA) "to encourage, develop, and attain an air
transportation system which relies on competitive market forces." Airline Deregulation Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705, 1705.
2. Remarks by President Jimmy Carter on signing the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978,
14 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1837, 1837 (Oct. 24, 1978) [hereinafter Remarks by President
Jimmy Carter].
3. Id.
4. See SUSAN J. TOLCHIN & MARTIN TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH
To DEREGULATE 1-37 (1983).
5. See id. at 250-56 (noting a considerable increase in state regulations while the federal
government deregulated industries).
6. Remarks by President Jimmy Carter, supra note 2, at 1837.
7. 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992).
8. The ADA added a preemption provision, § 105, to the FAA. Airline Deregulation
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 4, 92 Stat. 1705, 1707-08. (codified as amended at 49
U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988)).
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or serviees." 9
This Note explores the circumstances that gave rise to the dispute in
Morales and the reasoning behind the Court's decision.10 It examines
prior case law in order to assess whether the Court was justified in con-
cluding that federal law preempts state law in this instance.1  This Note
considers Morales's potential impact on a state's power to control the
content of airline advertising and concludes that the decision constrains
states to a degree beyond that envisioned by Congress. 12 Although the
Court attempted to limit the scope of its decision, this Note cautions that
Morales could be used to tie states' hands in other areas traditionally
within their regulatory reach.13
Congress viewed its adoption of the ADA as "overhaul[ing] the avi-
ation regulatory system."' 4 Prior to enactment of the ADA, the federal
Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) possessed broad authority to regulate the
airline industry, including the power to set interstate rates15 and to take
administrative actions against airlines for deceptive trade practices. 16
Under the pre-deregulation scheme, states also exercised industry over-
sight by regulating intrastate fares and prosecuting violations of state
laws against deceptive practices. 17 Congress included a "savings clause"
in prior aviation statutes' 8 that guaranteed the states a shared regulatory
role by maintaining existing common law and statutory remedies.' 9
9. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1).
10. See infra notes 22-76 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 77-143 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 144-85 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 174-85 and accompanying text.
14. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3773, 3775.
15. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034.
16. Id Section 411 of the FAA specifically empowered the CAB to "investigate and de-
termine whether any air carrier, foreign air carrier, or ticket agent has been or is engaged in
unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition in ai transportation or the sale
thereof." Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 411, 72 Stat. 731, 769 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381(a) (1988)). The CAB's predecessor, the Civil Aeronau-
tics Authority (CAA), possessed similar power dating back to 1938. Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938, ch. 601, § 411, 52 Stat. 973, 1003. The Court has held that the expression "unfair or
deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition" as used in the statutes should be given a
broader reading than the common-law meaning. American Airlines, Inc. v. North American
Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 85 (1956). The Court said the focus of the provision is on protect-
ing "the public interest" rather than on punishing wrongdoers or protecting injured competi-
tors. Id
17. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034 (citing Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290,
300 (1976)); see infra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
18. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 1106, 72 Stat. 731, 798; Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 1106, 52 Stat. 973, 1027.
19. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1506 (1988). This "savings clause" stipulates that "[n]othing con-
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Although this "savings clause" was not repealed when Congress
passed the ADA, the new statute did contain a specific federal preemp-
tion provision.2" That provision, § 1305(a)(1) of the United States Code,
mandates:
[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no interstate
agency or other political agency of two or more States shall
enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other
provision having the force and effect of law relating to rates,
routes, or services of any air carrier having authority under
subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation.2'
With airline deregulation just shy of its tenth birthday, the National
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG)22 in 1988 adopted guidelines
on advertising and marketing practices in the industry.23 NAAG speci-
fied that the Guidelines did not create new laws or regulations, but rather
explained "how existing state laws apply to air fare advertising and fre-
quent flyer programs." 24 The Guidelines themselves did not have the
force of law; instead they provided standards against which airlines could
assess whether a practice violated current state consumer protection
statutes.25
Perhaps instilled with a renewed sense of mission by the NAAG
Guidelines, the attorneys general of seven states26 sent an advisory mem-
orandum to major airlines in February 1988 cautioning that failure to
tained in this chapter shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common
law or by statute, but the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies." Ia
20. Id. § 1305(a)(1); Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034.
21. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988) (emphasis added). The meaning of the "relating
to" clause was the focus of the Court's analysis in Morales. See infra notes 46-53 and accom-
panying text.
22. NAAG was founded in 1907, and its membership includes the attorneys general from
all 50 states and U.S. territories. Note, To Form A More Perfect Union?: Federalism And
Informal Interstate Cooperation, 102 HARv. L. REV. 842, 842 n.2 (1989). The primary pur-
pose of NAAG is the exchange of information among the organization's members. Id. at 842.
23. National Association of Attorneys General, Task Force on the Air Travel Industry,
Revised Guidelines, (1988), reprinted in Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2041 app. [hereinafter NAAG
Guidelines]. NAAG also has issued guidelines on such subjects as federal and state antitrust
laws and car rental advertising. Note, supra note 22, at 842.
24. NAAG Guidelines, supra note 23, at 2041. For example, § 2.0 of the Guidelines is a
general provision requiring any air fare advertisement to be clear and nondeceptive. Id. at
2044. In its comments, the NAAG explained that this "restate[s] individual states' false adver-
tising and deceptive practices statutes as they apply to air fare and price advertising." Id.
25. See REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF NAAG TASK FORCE ON AIR TRAVEL
INDUSTRY (1987), reprinted in 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) S-1, S-2 to S-7 (Special
Supp. to No. 1345, Dec. 17, 1987).
26. The seven states were Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Texas,
and Wisconsin. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2035.
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disclose all fare surcharges conflicted with the Guidelines7 and repre-
sented a violation of state laws on deceptive advertising and unfair trade
practices.2 The attorneys general described the memorandum as a pre-
cursor to possible initiation of an enforcement action, and they urged the
airlines to comply with the disclosure requirement immediately.29 Nine
months later, the Texas attorney general sent a letter to several airlines,
including Trans World Airlines (TWA), announcing an intent to sue.3"
The airlines3 sued first, however, claiming in federal district court
that the states were precluded from regulating air fare advertising by the
preemption provision of the ADA.32 The airlines requested a declaratory
judgment that federal law preempted the surcharge-disclosure require-
ment in the Guidelines and sought to enjoin Texas from taking any action
regulating airline rates, routes, services, or advertising. 33 The district
court complied, granting plaintiffs a preliminary injunction, 34 and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.3" The court of appeals
found that "the history of federal legislation regulating airlines demon-
strates the intent of Congress to expressly preempt state regulation of
airline fare advertising, leaving no right of action that arises under state
law only."'36
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether the pre-
emption provision of the ADA prohibits the states from utilizing their
general consumer protection statutes to prevent allegedly deceptive air
fare advertising practices.
27. IaM at 2034. Section 2.5 of the Guidelines provides that "[a]ny fuel, tax, or other
surcharge to a fare must be included in the total advertised price of the fare." NAAG Guide-
lines, supra note 23, at 2048.
28. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034-35.
29. Id. at 2035.
30. Id.
31. Three airlines, TWA, Continental, and British Airways, brought an action in United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas, "seeking to enjoin the Attorney Gen-
eral of Texas from enforcing the NAAG Guidelines under cover of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act." Brief for the Respondent Airlines at 13, Morales (No. 90-1604).
32. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2035.
33. Id
34. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 712 F. Supp. 99, 101 (W.D. Tex.), af'd, 897
F.2d 773, 788 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 307 (1990). The court applied the
preliminary injunction to 33 other states. Id at 105-06.
35. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773, 788 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 307 (1990). The district court later made the injunction permanent, and the court of ap-
peals again affirmed. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Morales, 949 F.2d 141, 144-45 (5th Cir.
1991), affid in part, rev'd in part, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2041 (1992).
36. Mattox, 897 F.2d at 782.
37. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034.
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The Texas attorney general3" argued before the Supreme Court that
Texas law and federal law on deceptive airline activities are "complemen-
tary and square with the principles of federalism. ' ' 39 In addition, Texas
argued that courts consistently had opposed federal preemption of state
oversight of deceptive airline practices.' TWA and the other respondent
airlines41 maintained that the NAAG "Guidelines .. .represent the
states' concerted effort to micromanage the advertising of air fares on a
nationwide basis," and that this effort "cannot be squared with the
[ADA]."
4 2
In a five-to-three decision,43 the Supreme Court held that "the fare
advertising provisions of the NAAG Guidelines are pre-empted by the
ADA," 4 and it affirmed the award of injunctive relief.45 The majority
opinion, written by Justice Scalia, featured two basic steps of analysis: (1)
establishing the scope of the "relating to" clause in the ADA,4' and (2)
38. Attorneys general from 33 other states were also parties to the proceeding because
they were defendants in the lower court proceedings. Brief of Petitioner at ii, Morales (No. 90-
1604).
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. The Texas attorney general cited several cases in which state laws having only
indirect impacts on airline rates or services were not preempted. Id. at 28-32 (citing, among
other cases, West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and re-
manded, 112 S. Ct. 2932 (1992) (for further consideration in light of Morales); People v. West-
ern Airlines, Inc., 155 Cal. App. 3d 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1132
(1985)). For a detailed discussion of these and other cases supporting the attorney general's
argument, see infra notes 123-43 and accompanying text.
41. Joining TWA as respondent airlines were: Continental Airlines, Inc., British Airways
PLC, Air Canada, Compagnie Nationale Air France, Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.p.A., El
Al Israel Airlines, Ltd., Finnair, Lufthansa German Airlines, Japan Air Lines Company, Ltd.,
Quantas Airways, Ltd., Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS), Viacao Aerea Rio-Grandense
(VARIG), and Pan American World Airways, Inc.. Brief for the Respondent Airlines at ii,
Morales (No. 90-1604).
42. Id at 16.
43. Justices Scalia, White, O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas constituted the majority,
with Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Blackmun, dissenting.
Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2033. Justice Souter elected not to take part in the decision. The New
York Times suggested that as a former New Hampshire attorney general Justice Souter may
have felt that it would have been inappropriate for him to participate. Linda Greenhouse,
High Court Gives Airline Industry Victory Over States on Fare Ads, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1992,
at Al, D14.
44. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2041.
45. Id. The Court did rule, however, that the district court erred in granting the airlines
injunctive relief beyond simply enjoining Texas from enforcing the fare advertising provisions
of the Guidelines. Id at 2036. Justice Scalia said that in granting a "blunderbuss injunction"
the district court exceeded its injunctive power. Id. He added that because "petitioner has
threatened to enforce only the obligations described in the guidelines regarding fare advertis-
ing, the injunction must be vacated insofar as it restrains the operation of state laws with
respect to other matters." Id,
46. Id at 2036-38; see supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
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assessing whether the NAAG Guidelines fell within that scope and there-
fore should be preempted.47
To determine the proper breadth of the "relating to" clause, the ma-
jority looked to a line of cases in which the Court had interpreted a simi-
larly worded clause in a preemption provision of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).48 ERISA's preemp-
tion language stipulates that the provisions of the law "supersede any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan."149 The Court's ERISA holdings established that a state is
preempted from regulating an employee benefit plan where state law
"'has a connection with or reference to such a plan.' ,,5o Because of the
similarity in language between the preemption provisions of ERISA and
the ADA,51 Justice Scalia reasoned, "the same standard" should be
adopted in Morales.52 Consequently, Justice Scalia concluded that
"[s]tate enforcement actions having a connection with or reference to air-
line 'rates, routes, or services' are preempted" by the ADA.53
In the second step of its analysis, the Court determined that the
NAAG Guidelines relate to routes, rates, and services both by virtue of
their express language and the potential impact on the airlines caused by
their enforcement.54 The Court reviewed several sections of the Guide-
47. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2038-40.
48. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
One of ERISA's primary purposes is to establish standards that ensure the "equitable charac-
ter' of employee benefit plans. Id. § 1001(a). In addition, ERISA is intended to ensure that
benefit plans disclose financial information to plan participants. Id. § 1001(b). Finally,
ERISA is designed to ensure the financial soundness of benefit plans by requiring plans to meet
certain minimum funding standards. Id. § 1001(c).
49. Id. § 1144(a) (emphasis added).
50. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2037 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97
(1983)).
51. ERISA's preemption provision provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this sub-
chapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in
§ 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under § 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
The ADA's premption provision reads in full:
Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no State or political sub-
division thereof and no interstate agency or other political agency of two or more
States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision
having the force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any air carrier
having authority under subchapter IV of this chapter to provide air transportation.
49 U.S.C. app. § 1305 (1988) (emphasis added).
52. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2037.
53. Id (quoting 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988)).
54. Id at 2038-40.
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lines and noted specific references to fares. For example, the Court noted
that Section 2.1 requires disclosure in print advertisements of
"[v]ariations in fares to or from two or more airports serving the same
metropolitan area," as well as "[a]ny other material restriction on the
fare."55 Justice Scalia thus found it impossible to "avoid the conclusion
that these aspects of the Guidelines 'relate to' airline rates."56
Beyond simply making express references to fares, the majority said,
the NAAG Guidelines significantly affect them. The Court advanced
what is essentially an economic policy argument: Because the costs of
operating a flight are largely fixed, airlines need to sell as many seats as
possible at higher prices to consumers whose demand is not price sensi-
tive.5 7 Airlines must then attempt to fill the remaining seats by offering
lower prices to price-sensitive fliers.58 For this system to work success-
fully, the Court reasoned, airlines "must be able to place substantial re-
strictions on the availability of the lower priced seats (so as to sell as
many seats as possible at the higher rate), and must be able to advertise
the lower fares."59 In particular, the Court said the Guidelines' require-
ment that advertised fares be available in sufficient quantity to meet rea-
sonably foreseeable demand could jeopardize the airlines' use of their
marketing system altogether.' Justice Scalia concluded that "[a]ll in all,
the obligations imposed by the Guidelines would have a. significant im-
pact upon the airlines' ability to market their product, and hence a signif-
icant impact upon the fares they charge." 61
The majority attempted to limit its decision by stating that the hold-
ing does not address whether state regulation of non-price aspects of fare
advertising, such as laws against obscene content in advertisements,
would be preempted because such regulation also relates to fares.62 In
addition, perhaps anticipating criticism that the decision would leave air-
lines free to engage in deceptive practices,63 the Court noted that the U.S.
55. Id at 2039; NAAG Guidelines, supra note 23, at 2044-45.
56. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2039.
57. Id at 2040.
58. Id.
59. Id. The majority contended that the Guidelines have the effect of interfering with this
system by making it impossible to place shorter advertisements, by hampering airlines' abilities
to call attention to differences in normal and sale prices, and by forcing airlines to create
different advertisements for different markets. Id.
60. Id. Section 2.4 of the Guidelines, the Court noted, requires that "[a]ny advertised fare
... be available in sufficient quantity so as to meet reasonably foreseeable demand on every
flight each day for the market in which the advertisement appears." NAAG Guidelines, supra
note 23, at 2047.
61. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2040.
62. Id.
63. After the decision was reported, a representative of Public Citizen, a Washington-
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Department of Transportation could still regulate advertisements that in
the Department's judgment do not further competitive pricing in the
industry."r
Justice Stevens, in dissent, faulted the majority for overemphasizing
the narrow "relating to" language of the ADA while ignoring congres-
sional intent ascertainable through careful examination of the Act's lan-
gage, history, and structure.6 5 Justice Stevens wrote: "[Tihe Court
disregards established canons of statutory construction, and gives the
ADA preemption provision a construction that is neither compelled by
its text nor supported by its legislative history." 66
Justice Stevens pointed to the doctrinal presumption that Congress
does not intend to preempt areas traditionally within the states' regula-
tory purview.67 Although acknowledging that prohibitions on air fare
advertising relate indirectly to fares, routes, and services, Justice Stevens
maintained that they relate directly and primarily only to advertising.
68
He reasoned that the prohibitions are "designed to affect the nature of
the advertising, not the nature of the product. '69
Justice Stevens stated that, unless congressional intent is clearly dis-
played, the Court should not find that Congress precluded state action
indirectly affecting rates.70 In support of his conclusion that no such
congressional intent to displace state law existed here, Justice Stevens
reasoned:
Because Congress did not eliminate federal regulation of
unfair or deceptive practices, and because state and federal
prohibitions of unfair or deceptive practices had coexisted dur-
ing the period of federal regulation, there is no reason to believe
that Congress intended [the preemption provision] to immunize
the airlines from state liability for engaging in deceptive or mis-
leading advertising.71
based consumer group, was quoted as concluding that the ruling would leave air travelers
"without a remedy... for fraudulent or misleading advertising." Paul M. Barrett, High Court
Blocks State Regulation Of Air Fare Ads, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1992, at B10.
64. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2040.
65. Id. at 2055 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
66. Ia (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens said this presumption against preemption
stems from the fact that the Court's preemption analysis "'must be guided by respect for the
separate spheres of governmental authority preserved in our federalist system."' Id. (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 522 (1981)).
68. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
69. Id (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
70. Id at 2055-56 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id at 2057 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent's conclusion is based on the fact that,
when Congress amended the aviation code by adopting the ADA, it retained both the provi-
[Vol. 71
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Furthermore, the dissent argued, the legislative history of the ADA does
not reflect congressional intent to exercise broad preemptive power over
state action.72 In particular, Justice Stevens noted that in congressional
hearings on the Act, the CAB testified that the preemption provision of
the bill represented a codification of existing law, leaving intact the
state's historical role in intrastate matters.73
The dissent was unpersuaded by the airlines' economic argument,
adopted by the majority, that compliance with the Guidelines ultimately
would affect the airlines' rates.74 First, Justice Stevens indicated that he
disagreed with the majority that a significant fare impact by state law
would warrant a finding of preemption.75 Second, because the airlines
had not proved that the effect of compliance with the Guidelines, in fact,
would be significant, Justice Stevens stated that he would have dissented
even if he agreed with the majority's standard.76
The preemption doctrine traces its beginnings to Article VI of the
Constitution,77 which provides that "the Laws of the United States...
shall be the supreme Law of the Land. '78 Under this supremacy clause,
Congress may preempt state law in a particular field expressly or by im-
plication.79 In the absence of an explicit declaration of preemption in the
language of a federal statute, congressional intent to preempt state law
"may be clear from the pervasiveness of the federal scheme, the need for
uniformity, or the danger of conflict between the enforcement of state
sion allowing the CAB to investigate unfair trade practices and the "savings clause" preserving
common-law and statutory remedies. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2057-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2058 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Airline Deregulation Act of 1978: Hearings
on H. 8813 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public Works and
Transportation, 95th Cong, 1st Sess. 200 (1977)). Under the pre-ADA scheme, states were free
to apply their own laws on deceptive trade practices to the airline industry. Id at 2034 (citing
Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 300 (1976)). For a discussion of Nader, see
infra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
74. See Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2058-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
75. Id at 2058 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 2059 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens added: "Surely Congress could
not have intended to pre-empt every state and local law and regulation that similarly increases
the airlines' costs of doing business and, consequently, has a similar 'significant impact' upon
their rates." Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
77. Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982). Preemp-
tion doctrine dictates that where federal law exists and is on point, it is paramount over and
trumps state law. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.1,
at 311 (4th ed. 1991); Paul R. Verkuil, Preemption Of State Law By the Federal Trade Com-
mission, 1976 DuK, L.J. 225, 229.
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
79. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); NowAx & ROTUNDA, supra
note 77, § 9.1.
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laws and the administration of federal programs.""0
In assessing its role in reviewing preemption matters, the Court has
said that its task "is to ascertain Congress's intent in enacting the federal
statute at issue."81 Consequently, preemption analysis centers on statu-
tory interpretation. 2 At the same time, the Court has recognized the
limited utility of prior cases on preemption in that "each case turns on
the peculiarities and special features of the federal regulatory scheme in
question." 3
Prior to the beginnings of airline deregulation in the late 1970s, the
states and the federal government both played roles in industry over-
sight.8 4 The division between their spheres of authority was not always
clearly marked, however. In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,5 the
Court attempted to define and clarify the division between federal and
state responsibility.
The action in Nader was initiated by an airline passenger who ar-
rived at the boarding and check-in area five minutes before takeoff only
to be denied a seat because the carrier had overbooked the flight.8 6 The
passenger sought compensatory and punitive damages based on the com-
mon-law cause of action for fraudulent misrepresentation. 87 At issue in
Nader was whether the passenger could maintain his common-law action
even though the Federal Aviation Act (FAA) provided for administra-
tive action by the CAB. 8 The district court awarded judgment for the
80. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 77, § 9.4; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Regulation,
Deregulation, Federalism, and Administrative Law: Agency Power to Preempt State Regulation,
46 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 607, 630 (1985) (analyzing three categories of preemption: occupation by
Congress of the entire field of regulation, direct conflicts between the regulatory schemes of the
federal and state governments, and existence of state actions that frustrate federal regulatory
goals).
81. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95.
82. Pierce, supra note 80, at 629.
83. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973).
84. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
85. 426 U.S. 290, 298-303 (1976).
86. Id at 292-93.
87. Id at 295. Fraudulent misrepresentation is
[a] false statement as to material fact, made with intent that another rely thereon,
which is believed by other party and on which he relies and by which he is induced to
act and does act to his injury, and statement is fraudulent if speaker knows statement
to be false or if it is made with utter disregard of its truth or falsity.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (6th ed. 1990).
88. Nader, 426 U.S. at 296. Section 411 of the FAA provided that the CAB could issue a
cease-and-desist order if it determined after investigation that a carrier was engaged in unfair
or deceptive practices. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 411, 72 Stat, 731,
769 (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1381(a) (1988)).
[Vol. 71
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plaintiff on his common-law action.89 The court of appeals, however,
stayed the action pending a determination by the CAB of whether failure
to reveal the practice of overbooking fell within the agency's purview
under the FAA. The court further concluded that a finding by the CAB
that the practice was not deceptive would preclude the plaintiff's com-
mon-law action.90
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the FAA could not be
read to confer on the agency the power to "immunize [airline] carriers
from common-law liability." 91 The common-law action and the statute
could "coexist," according to the Court, by virtue of the FAA's savings
clause, which provided that nothing in the Act precluded remedies avail-
able at common law or under statute.92 The Nader decision thus illus-
trates that in the regulated airline environment existing before the ADA,
states could enforce their own laws against deceptive trade practices.93
Passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 arguably confused
the distinction between state and federal roles, because, while Congress
included a specific provision preempting states from enforcing laws relat-
ing to rates, routes, or services, 94 it did not repeal the savings clause.95
What then formed the basis for the Morales majority's opinion that the
states were preempted by the ADA from enforcing the air fare advertis-
ing Guidelines through their consumer protection statutes? Because it
based its decision on an analogy between the "relating to" clause of the
ADA and a similarly worded clause in ERISA,96 the Court drew primar-
ily upon a line of cases interpreting ERISA's preemption provision.
The first of these cases, Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc.,97 in-
volved a New Jersey statute prohibiting employers from offsetting the
amount of pension benefits to which an employee was entitled by the
amount of workers' compensation awards for which that employee was
eligible.98 The Supreme Court addressed whether ERISA preempted the
state statute because the statute related to an employee benefit plan.99 In
89. Nader, 426 U.S. at 295.
90. Id. at 296.
91. IA at 300-01.
92. Id at 300.
93. See Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034.
94. 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
95. Id § 1506; see supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
97. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
98. Id. at 507-08.
99. See id at 507.
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a unanimous decision by eight justices,"c° the Court found federal pre-
emption to be contingent upon a clear display of congressional intent or
upon an indisputable conclusion that the "nature of the regulated sub-
ject" allows for nothing but preemption. 10' The Court determined first
that the preemption provision in ERISA provided an "explicit congres-
sional statement"' 2 and then focused on the remaining issue-whether
the state statute related to employee benefit plans and therefore fell
within Congress's intended scheme. 10 3 Because the state law eliminated
one of the permissible federal methods of calculating pension benefits, the
Court held that the law related to benefit plans and thus was pre-
empted. °4 The Alessi decision assumes particular significance because of
the Court's statement that it did not matter that the state "intrude[d]
indirectly, through a workers' compensation law, rather than directly
through a statute called 'pension regulation.' "105 Alessis preemption
message, therefore, is that "even indirect state action... may encroach
upon the area of exclusive federal concern."' 10 6
The Court further defined the scope of ERISA's "relate to" preemp-
tion provision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.10 At issue in Shaw were
two state laws prohibiting discrimination in employee benefit plans on
the basis of pregnancy and requiring employers to pay sick-leave benefits
to pregnant employees who were unable to work.108 The Court held that
ERISA preempted these statutes."° Writing for a unanimous Court,
Justice Blackmun explained that a "law 'relates to' an employee benefit
plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or
reference to such a plan." 110
100. Justice Brennan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case. Id at
506.
101. Id. at 522.
102. Id. In support of its conclusion, the Court cited the "relate to" language of ERISA's
preemption provision. Id.
103. IM at 523.
104. Id. at 524. The state statute preventing offsets based on workers' compensation
clashed with the federally approved use of integration in calculating pension benefits. Id. The
Court explained that "ERISA permits integration of pension funds with other public income
maintenance moneys for the purpose of calculating benefits, and the IRS interpretation ap-
proves integration with the exact funds addressed by the New Jersey workers' compensation
law." Id.
105. Id. at 525 (emphasis added).
106. Id.
107. 463 U.S. 85, 95.100 (1983).
108. Id at 88. The plaintiffs in Shaw were corporations that, prior to the New York laws,
had not included pregnancy disability benefits in the benefit packages offered to employees.
The corporations argued that ERISA preempted the new state requirements. Id. at 92.
109. Id at 100.
110. Id at 96-97 (emphasis added). In reaching this conclusion, the Court examined the
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Two years later, the Supreme Court in Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co. v. Massachusetts"' validated the broad preemption standard articu-
lated in Shaw." 2 Metropolitan involved possible ERISA preemption of a
Massachusetts law requiring employee plans to guarantee state residents
certain minimum benefits for mental health care. 113 Writing once again
for the Court, Justice Blackmun stated that "[t]he [ERISA] preemption
provision was intended to displace all state laws that fall within its
sphere, even including state laws that are consistent with ERISA's sub-
stantive requirements.""' 4 Despite atffrming Shaw's broad interpretation
of ERISA's preemption provision, however, the Metropolitan Court con-
cluded that the state's mandated benefits law was protected from pre-
emption by ERISA's savings clause. 115
In Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Service, Inc.," 6 the Court
acknowledged its own record of supporting a broad interpretation of
ERISA's preemption clause, but it also recognized limitations on ERISA
preemption. The Court held in Mackey that a Georgia statutory provi-
sion specifically exempting ERISA employee benefit plans from state gar-
plain language of ERISA's preemption clause, the structure of the Act, and the Act's legisla-
tive history. Id. at 96-100. On the latter issue, Justice Blackmun noted that the original bill
contained a preemption provision that applied only to state laws relating to the specific subject
matter in ERISA, such as "reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like." Id. at
98. During conference committee work on the legislation, this limited approach was rejected
by the lawmakers in favor of a preemption provision that they indicated should be interpreted
broadly. Id. (citing H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1280, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974); S. CONF.
REP. No. 1090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1974)).
111. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
112. Id at 739.
113. Id at 727.
114. Id at 739 (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 740-45. ERISA contains a provision similar to that found in the ADA, stipu-
lating that with certain exceptions, nothing in the statute "shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking or securities."
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1988). The ERISA savings clause shielded the mandated benefits
statute in Metropolitan from preemption because the applicable state law regulated insurance
and thus fell within the savings clause, even though the law also related to pension plans and
might have been preempted in the absence of the savings clause. Metropolitan, 471 U.S. at 744.
The Court seemed frustrated that Congress would include in ERISA a broad provision
preempting state law, while at the same time including a broad savings clause apparently
"preserv[ing] the States' lawmaking power over much of the same regulation." Id. at 740.
Although commenting that the statute was "not a model of legislative drafting," the Court
nevertheless proceeded to analyze it under two basic assumptions: (1) that the ordinary mean-
ing of the statutory language reflects legislative purpose, and (2) that Congress did not intend
to preempt areas in which states traditionally have been free to regulate. Id Based on these
assumptions, and on legislative history, the Court decided that the Massachusetts law regu-
lated insurance and therefore was "saved from pre-emption by the operation of the savings
clause." Id. at 743-44.
116. 486 U.S. 825 (1988).
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nishment proceedings fell within the "federal law's preemptive reach. ' 117
The Court stopped short, however, of preempting Georgia's entire gar-
nishment procedure, despite petitioner's contention that welfare benefit
plans subject to garnishment would likely incur substantial costs.1 "
In FMC Corporation v. Holliday,"9 the Court again applied its
broad test (that a state law "relate[s] to" an ERISA benefit plan if it
makes reference to or bears a connection to such a plan) to preempt a
state antisubrogation statute. At issue was whether ERISA preempted a
Pennsylvania statute "precluding employee welfare benefit plans from ex-
ercising subrogation rights on a claimant's tort recovery."' 120 The Court
held that the Pennsylvania law both made reference to and bore a con-
nection to benefit plans covered by the federal statute.' 2 1 In a 7-1 ruling,
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, provided some insight into
the Court's philosophy behind federal preemption in the ERISA context:
To require plan providers to design their programs in an envi-
ronment of differing State regulations would complicate the ad-
ministration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that
employers might offset with decreased benefits. Thus, where a
"patchwork scheme of regulation would introduce considerable
inefficiencies in benefit program operation," we have applied
the preemption clause to ensure that benefit plans will be gov-
erned by only a single set of regulations. 122
At roughly the same time the Supreme Court was broadly interpret-
ing the ERISA preemption clause, several state courts and lower federal
courts were adopting a more limited view of the ADA's "relating to"
preemption clause.123 In People v. Western Airlines, Inc.,12 for example,
California brought a civil action against an airline for allegedly making
117. Id at 830.
118. Id at 831-32. The majority recognized that ERISA plans are exposed to a variety of
state civil law claims that are not preempted even though they may affect the plans and their
trustees. Id at 833.
119. 111 S. Ct. 403 (1990).
120. Id at 405. The case involved a plan beneficiary who settled a negligence action
against the driver of the automobile in which she was injured. While the negligence action was
pending, the operator of the benefit plan, FMC Corporation, notified the beneficiary that it
would seek reimbursement for medical expenses the plan had covered. The beneficiary as-
serted that the Pennsylvania statute did not permit subrogation by FMC. Id at 406.
121. Id at 408.
122. Id (quoting Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 11 (1987)) (citation
omitted).
123. See West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 923 F.2d 657, 660 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and
remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2932 (1992) (for further consideration in fight of Morales); New York v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); People v. Western Airlines,




false and misleading statements in an advertising promotion.1 2 The trial
court agreed with the defendant's argument that the state cause of action
was precluded by § 1305.126 The California appellate court reversed,
holding that nothing in the federal airline regulatory scheme suggested
that Congress intended to preclude states from regulating deceptive ad-
vertising or that enforcement of the state's false advertising statutes
would thwart congressional objectives.127 In addition, the court stated
that, in light of the Act's savings clause 128 preserving common-law and
statutory remedies, the state cause of action can be precluded only
"where the federal and state regulatory schemes conflict
irreconcilably." 129
Another example of a court's narrower view of preemption under
the ADA is West v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,'130 a case that arose out of a
context factually similar to the pre-deregulation case of Nader.1 31  In
West a ticket holder who arrived at the gate only to be told that his flight
was overbooked filed a claim in state court, alleging a breach of the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing under Montana law.' 3 2 The federal
district court1 33 granted the defendant airline's summary judgment mo-
tion, resting its decision in part on the preemption of the plaintiff's state
law claim by federal law.'
3 4
The court of appeals reversed, noting initially that "when Congress
legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the states, . . . there is a
124. 155 Cal. App. 3d 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. 237 (Cal. App. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1132
(1985).
125. Id. at 599, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 238.
126. Id Section 1305 prohibits states from enacting or enforcing laws "relating to [air
carriers'] rates, routes, or services." 49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988); see supra notes 20-21
and accompanying text.
127. Western Airlines, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 238-39.
128. The ADA includes a clause providing that its protections are supplementary to, and
not an abridgment of, existing state remedies. See supra note 19.
129. Western Airlines, 155 Cal. App. 3d at 600, 202 Cal. Rptr. at 239 (citing Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 299 (1976)). Cf. Brunwasser v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1338, 1345-46 (W.D. Pa. 1982) (pointing to the savings clause as evidence
that, although federal regulation of the airline industry is extensive, it is not exclusive).
130. 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2932 (1992) (for
further consideration in light of Morales, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992)).
131. 426 U.S. 290 (1976); see supra notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
132. West, 923 F.2d at 658-59. After the plaintiff purchased his ticket, the airline reduced
the size of the aircraft for the flight without informing the plaintiff or airline sales agents. Id.
at 658. The airline requested volunteers to give up their seats "in exchange for certain pay-
ments," but not enough seated passengers deplaned to make room for the plaintiff. Id
133. Northwest Airlines petitioned to have the case removed to federal court because of
diversity of citizenship. Id. at 659.
134. Id.
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presumption against finding preemption of state law."'35 The court,
although agreeing that boarding policies constitute "services" within the
meaning of the ADA's preemption provision, maintained that the provi-
sion's "relating to" clause did not necessarily apply to "all state laws that
affect airline services, however tangentially." '136 Instead, the court con-
cluded that the provision "preempts claims only when the underlying
statute or regulation itself relates to airline services, regardless of whether
the claim arises from a factual setting involving airline services. Thus,
state laws that merely have an effect on airline services are not
preempted."'
37
A similarly narrow approach to ADA preemption was taken by a
federal district court in New York v. Trans World Airlines,38 a case fac-
tually related to the dispute in Morales. While aspects of the airlines' suit
against the Texas attorney general over the NAAG Guidelines were still
being litigated in the district court in Texas, New York initiated actions
against TWA and Pan Am in state court, 139 alleging violations of New
York's false advertising statute.14° In an opinion involving issues of ju-
risdiction and removal as well as preemption, the district court con-
cluded that federal law did not preempt New York's regulation of air
fare advertising.' 4 1 The court cautioned that a conclusion that the "re-
lating to" clause of the ADA is so broad as to preempt New York's laws
against false advertising "conceivably could doom every state regulation
affecting airlines."' 42 The court added:
135. Id.
136. Id at 660.
137. Id. This conclusion was directed at situations where Congress has used explicitly
preemptive language in the federal statute. Id at 659-60.
The court noted, however, that preemption can also exist (1) by implication, when there is
evidence Congress intended to occupy an entire field, and (2) by virtue of a conflict between
federal and state law. Id at 659; see supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. Congress's
retention of the savings clause when it adopted the ADA is evidence that it did not intend for
federal law to occupy the entire field covered by the state law; consequently, the court found
no implied preemption. West, 923 F.2d at 661. The court also saw no reason to conclude that
requiring the airline to comply with a duty of good faith and fair dealing under state law would
prevent the airline from also complying with federal regulations. Id For this reason, it found
no conflict preemption with respect to plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages. The court
did, however, preempt plaintiff's claim for punitive damages because overbooking is an accept-
able practice under federal regulations, and "any scheme that punishes the practice would be
inconsistent with applicable federal law." Id
138. 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
139. The airlines were successful in having the state court cases removed to federal court.
Id at 164-66.
140. Id at 165-66.
141. Id at 176. Nor did the court find that New York's false advertising actions were
precluded by implied preemption or conflict preemption. Id. at 177-80.
142. Id at 176.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
[A]ny relationship between New York's enforcement of its laws
against deceptive advertising and Pan Am's rates, routes, and
services is remote and indirect. In challenging Pan Am's ad-
vertising, New York does not care about how much Pan Am
charges, where it flies, or what amenities it provides its passen-
gers. Its sole concern is with the manner in which Pan Am
advertises those matters to New York consumers. 143
Thus, these lower federal and state court decisions adopting a narrow
view of the ADA's preemption provision stand in stark contrast to the
line of Supreme Court cases favoring a broad interpretation of ERISA's
similarly worded preemption provision.
Ironically, what makes the Morales decision puzzling is the fact that
the majority opinion on its face reflects a logical application of the pre-
emption precedent - or at least a particular part of that precedent. An-
alyzed solely in light of the cases interpreting the preemption provision in
ERISA,44 Morales reaches a sensible conclusion. Morales involved an
explicit preemption by Congress, as reflected in the "relating to" clause
of § 1305(a)(1); the issue confronting the Court was the appropriate
scope of that preemption. The Court's ERISA jurisprudence established
that the "relate to" clause of ERISA is broad in scope and that state
actions making reference to or having a connection with employee benefit
plans will be preempted by the federal law. 145 Morales adopts the
ERISA analogy, plugs the facts into the model developed from the
ERISA cases,14 6 and reaches the same result.'"
After drawing upon the analogous aspects of ERISA and the ADA,
Justice Scalia argued convincingly that both in terms of the language of
the ADA and by virtue of the possible impact of the state action on the
airlines, Texas should be preempted from enforcing the NAAG Guidelines
through its general consumer protection statutes. 48 The "relating to"
language in the ADA preemption clause is very similar to the wording in
ERISA; 49 the airline advertising Guidelines that Texas wanted to en-
143. Id.
144. See supra notes 97-122 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
146. The ERISA cases seem to establish a two-step analysis for resolution of preemption
questions under the statute: (1) What was Congress's intent? (In other words, what did Con-
gress mean by the "relate to" clause?) (2) Does the state action in contention fall within
Congress's preemptive intent? (In other words, does the state action make reference to or have
a connection with the subject matter?)
147. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 51.
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force make specific references to fares;' 50 and compliance with the disclo-
sure requirements of the Guidelines could increase airlines' marketing
costs and ultimately result in an increase in fares."' 1 Arguably, under the
model provided by the ERISA cases, the state laws "relate to" fares and
should be preempted.
Despite its apparently rational reasoning, the Morales decision raises
many questions: What weight should the Court give to the legislative
history of the ADA and other aviation statutes in assessing congressional
intent with respect to preemption? Is ERISA an appropriate analogy for
determining the scope of the "relating to" preemption provision in the
ADA? What is the impact of the Court's decision that the advertising
Guidelines fall within the scope of the ADA provision, and how will
Morales be interpreted in future cases on preemption affecting the airline
industry or other industries?
If there is a universally accepted principle in the law on federal pre-
emption, it is that the controlling consideration is Congress's intent in
enacting the federal statute." 2 Both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in Morales acknowledged this principle. 3 What distinguishes
the opinions in large part is the different directions in which they travel
from this common starting point.
For the majority, Justice Scalia addressed the language of the statute
and opined that "'the ordinary meaning of that language accurately ex-
presses the legislative purpose.' 154 This path led Justice Scalia to
ERISA as an analogue and primary basis (in conjunction with his eco-
nomic policy argument) 5' for the holding." 6 The dissent, however,
traced the regulatory developments leading to passage of the ADA and
examined the legislative history of the statute itself to ascertain congres-
sional intent. 5 7 This divergence in approaches taken by the majority
150. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
152. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 738 (1985); Shaw v. Delta
Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95 (1983); Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 152 (1982); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 77, §§ 9.1 to 9.4,
at 311-15.
The Supreme Court, for example, stated in Shaw that "[i]n deciding whether a federal law
pre-empts a state statute, [the] task is to ascertain Congress's intent in enacting the federal
statute at issue." Shaw, 463 U.S. at 95.
153. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2036, 2055 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id at 2036 (quoting FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 111 S. Ct. 403, 407 (1990)).
155. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 71
FEDERAL PREEMPTION
and the dissent in Morales highlights fundamental diferences on the
Court concerning how legislative intent is evaluated.
The majority's reliance on the express language of the statute is il-
lustrative of Justice Scalia's general distrust of legislative history as a tool
in statutory interpretation. 158 Justice Scalia is a proponent of textualism,
or the "venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that
language must be given effect-at least in the absence of a patent absurd-
ity." 9 Consequently, his analysis in Morales turns to the "relating to"
phrase in the ADA preemption provision and concludes it should be
given an ordinary, broad meaning. 6 °
Within the legislative history of the ADA, however, exists support
for the dissent's approach that the language should be interpreted nar-
rowly because Congress never intended to prevent states from regulating
airlines' advertising practices.'61 During the development of the legisla-
tion that eventually became the ADA, the House of Representatives and
the Senate expressed generally similar understandings of Congress's leg-
islative mission: the gradual introduction of increased competition
within the airline industry.'6 2 Not surprisingly, however, the two cham-
bers adopted bills with different specific provisions on how to accomplish
that mission. The House bill proposed the "relating to" preemption lan-
158. Justice Scalia argues that statutory text is the proper source for insight into a law's
meaning and that reliance on legislative history is misplaced. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDozo L. REv. 1597, 1598 (1991). Tradi-
tionally, however, the Court has looked to legislative history to put the language of a statute in
context. Eskridge, supra, at 621.
Ironically, many of the ERISA cases cited by the Morales majority were themselves re-
solved based upon the kind of examination of legislative history that Scalia rejects. See Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 745-47 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983). It is also ironic that on one hand the majority utilizes a
narrow, focused examination of essentially one phrase in the federal statute, but on the other
hand adopts the respondents' rather broad and circuitous policy argument that compliance
with the NAAG Guidelines may lead to increased fares. See supra notes 57-61 and accompany-
ing text.
159. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Eskridge,
supra note 158, at 623 & n.11 (discussing Cardoza-Fonseca and labeling Scalia's textualism
"new" because it is inspired by "public choice theory, strict separation of powers, and ideologi-
cal conservatism").
160. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2036-37.
161. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
162. See H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3737, 3740. The House described its bill as "a moderate reform bill which in-
troduces more competition and less regulation of the airline industry on a gradual, controlled
basis." Id. The Senate stated that its bill was "intended to provide the domestic air transpor-
tation industry with the same competitive incentives which face most other American indus-
tries." S. REP'. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978).
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guage that ultimately was included in the ADA and was at issue in
Morales.16 A House report interpreted the representatives' approach in
narrow terms, explaining that under the House's preemption provision a
state may not regulate a carrier's routes, rates, or services.164 The Senate
bill, however, stipulated that "[n]o State shall enact any law, establish
any standard determining routes, schedules, or rates, fares, or charges in
tariffs of, or otherwise promulgate economic regulations for, any air car-
rier" covered by the legislation. 165
As the dissent in Morales noted, the House Conference Report,
which states that the conferees adopted the House bill, describes the bill
in the same narrow terms used in the House Report.1 66 This piece of
legislative history of the "relating to" clause lends support to the dis-
sent's argument that the clause should be given a narrow interpretation.
Although Justice Scalia's textualism approach may explain what led
him to ignore the ADA's legislative history, it does not explain com-
pletely the relevance of the ERISA analogy. Under the tenets of textual-
ism, "[g]uidance may be obtained not only from the text of the disputed
provision, but from the text of other related statutes."1 67 Justice Scalia
and the Morales majority, however, do not clearly explain why ERISA, a
statute governing employee benefit plans, was chosen as the best analogy
for resolving a dispute over preemption in an airline deregulation stat-
ute. 16  If the lesson from Morales is that the answers to questions about
preemption are to be found in the specific language of the contested stat-
ute and its analogues, the Court could have improved the utility of the
decision significantly by providing a standard for determining when pre-
emption wording is too dissimilar for the ERISA analogy to apply.
The Morales Court's heavy reliance on ERISA is especially unusual
in light of the fact that preemption decisions often are case specific-
based on the particular relationship between the federal and state statutes
163. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2058 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3737, 3752.
165. S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1978).
166. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2058 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens argued that
"[tihere is, therefore, no indication that the Conferees thought the House's 'relating to' lan-
guage would have a broader pre-emptive scope than the Senate's 'determining... or otherwise
promulgate economic regulation' language." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Zeppos, supra note 158, at 1615.
168. The only reason provided by the majority is that the preemption provisions in the
ADA and ERISA are "similarly worded." Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2037. The Court simply said
it had "repeatedly recognized" the broad preemptive reach of the "relate to" clause in address-
ing ERISA's preemption provision. Id.
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and the regulatory scheme to which they apply.169 Morales illustrates
that a majority of the Justices are willing to assume that if Congress used
similar preemption language in different statutes, it must have intended
for the statutes to be interpreted in the same way, despite other unique
features that each statutory scheme may have.
After using ERISA to give the ADA's "relating to" preemption pro-
vision a broad scope, the Court decided the NAAG Guidelines fell within
that scope, in part because they made specific references to fares.17 In-
terestingly, the Court focused on the language of the Guidelines even
though it framed the issue in the case in terms of whether states were
preempted from using their general consumer protection statutes to influ-
ence advertising content.17 ' Reliance on the Guidelines, which address
the airline industry specifically, rather than on the Texas statute, which
does not,172 arguably simplified the Court's job of finding grounds for
preemption. 173
Although the route traveled by the majority offers lessons on the
current Court's preemption philosophy, the road not taken also provides
insight into the significance of Morales. The majority makes no mention
of the federal and state court cases, such as West v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc.174 or People v. Western Airlines, Inc, 17. which interpreted the
ADA's preemption language more narrowly and held that state statutes
related only tangentially to airline rates, routes, or services are not pre-
empted by the ADA.176 By failing to acknowledge these decisions, the
majority makes it clear that state statutes that do not specifically address
the preempted subject matter but that nonetheless affect it indirectly are
likely to be preempted. 177
In addition, Morales leaves unanswered questions about the deci-
169. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624, 638 (1973); NOWAK &
ROTuNDA, supra note 77, § 9.1. As a result, "it is difficult to apply the rationale underlying a
decision in one field to the problem in another context." Id.
170. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
171. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2034, 2038-40.
172. See TExAs Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41, 17.46 (West 1987).
173. It is significant that in the ERISA cases cited by the majority, the Court focused on
state statutes that themselves interfered with the federally preempted field. See supra notes 97-
122 and accompanying text.
174. 923 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1990), vacated and remanded, 112 S. Ct. 2932 (1992) (for
further consideration in light of Morales).
175. 155 Cal. App. 3d 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. 237 (Cal. App. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 1132
(1985).
176. See supra notes 123-43 and accompanying text.
177. The Supreme Court already has vacated and remanded West to the court of appeals; it
reached this decision only a few days after filing its Morales opinion. See Northwest Airlines,
Inc. v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2932 (1992).
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sion's future application to state regulatory involvement in the content of
air fare advertising. Drawing an analogy to Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 7 ' the Court explained that certain state actions or rules may affect
air fares too tenuously or peripherally for preemption to apply.179 The
Court admitted, however, that it provided no guidance on where the line
should be drawn."' In addition, the majority opted not to address the
extent to which the "nonprice aspects of fare advertising" might relate to
rates, routes, or services. 18 1
This lack of guidance from the Court is troubling. It is conceivable
under Morales that almost any state action in the airline sector could be
deemed ultimately and circuitously to impact air fares and therefore
would be preempted. Without some standard for determining the outer
parameters of when conduct by the state does or does not "relate to"
airline rates, routes, or services, Morales leaves open the possibility that
lower courts will preempt a wide variety of state activities whose impact
on rates, routes, or services in the airline industry is very tenuous.
After Morales, it is clear that the Court is ever more likely to center
its analysis of legislative intent exclusively on the specific statutory lan-
guage.'" 2 Additionally, given the broad scope that Morales gives to fed-
eral preemption provisions precluding activity "relating to" a subject
area, 8 3 one can predict that almost all state laws, rules, or actions that
concern the subject area, directly or indirectly, are likely to be
preempted.
If the only responsibility facing the Court when considering the pre-
emption question was to dissect the particular preclusive wording in the
federal statute, the Morales decision could not be faulted. There are,
however, other principles of preemption that render the Court's ap-
proach in this case too restrictive. A key component of preemption, one
that forms the underlying justification for the doctrine, is congressional
intent. Whether the Court chooses to rely on it or not, it is undeniable
that evidence of congressional intent can be found in more places than
178. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
179. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2040. In Shaw, the Court acknowledged that ERISA's preemp-
tion provision may not reach state actions that impact employee benefit plans so remotely that
it is impossible to conclude that underlying statutes relate to the plans. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100
n.21.
180. Morales, 112 S. Ct. at 2040. The Court stated that because Morales did not pose a
borderline question the Court would "'express no views about where it would be appropriate
to draw the line.'" Id. (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100 n.21).
181. Id. at 2040.
182. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
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the language of the statute alone.' Further, as the dissent in Morales
noted,185 the Court must be guided by the principle that there is a pre-
sumption against preemption in areas traditionally occupied by the
states.
By focusing almost exclusively on the "relating to" language of the
preemption clause in the Airline Deregulation Act, the Morales Court
effectively locked the states out of a regulatory arena in which they tradi-
tionally have operated. Although Congress explicitly stated its desire to
preempt states from thwarting federal attempts at airline deregulation,
the legislative history of the ADA does not reveal an intent to make the
scope of preemption so broad that every state action with even a tangen-
tial or remote effect on rates, routes, or services is nullified.
Morales sends the signal that preemption language in one statute
may be used to afford an equally exhaustive reach to another federal stat-
ute without full weight being given to potential differences in legislative
histories or in regulatory subjects and goals. Using this limited approach
to discover congressional intent risks undermining federalism's strategy
of shared power between the states and the federal government. Given
that the touchstone of preemption analysis is the congressional intent be-
hind the federal enactment, the Supreme Court has an obligation to avail
itself of more than one method of discerning that intent.
ERIC W. MACLURE
184. See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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